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Abstract
Recent work has demonstrated that neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples,
i.e., inputs that are almost indistinguishable from natural data and yet classified incorrectly
by the network. In fact, some of the latest findings suggest that the existence of adversarial
attacks may be an inherent weakness of deep learning models. To address this problem, we
study the adversarial robustness of neural networks through the lens of robust optimization.
This approach provides us with a broad and unifying view on much of the prior work on this
topic. Its principled nature also enables us to identify methods for both training and attacking
neural networks that are reliable and, in a certain sense, universal. In particular, they specify
a concrete security guarantee that would protect against any adversary. These methods let
us train networks with significantly improved resistance to a wide range of adversarial attacks.
They also suggest the notion of security against a first-order adversary as a natural and broad
security guarantee. We believe that robustness against such well-defined classes of adversaries is
an important stepping stone towards fully resistant deep learning models.
1 Introduction
Recent breakthroughs in computer vision and speech recognition are bringing trained classifiers
into the center of security-critical systems. Important examples include vision for autonomous cars,
face recognition, and malware detection. These developments make security aspects of machine
learning increasingly important. In particular, resistance to adversarially chosen inputs is becoming
a crucial design goal. While trained models tend to be very effective in classifying benign inputs,
recent work [22, 7, 14, 20] shows that an adversary is often able to manipulate the input so that the
model produces an incorrect output.
This phenomenon has received particular attention in the context of deep neural networks, and
there is now a quickly growing body of work on this topic [6, 12, 16, 18, 23, 21, 25]. Computer
vision presents a particularly striking challenge: very small changes to the input image can fool
state-of-the-art neural networks with high probability [22, 7, 14, 20, 13]. This holds even when the
benign example was classified correctly, and the change is imperceptible to a human. Apart from the
security implications, this phenomenon also demonstrates that our current models are not learning
the underlying concepts in a robust manner. All these findings raise a fundamental question:
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How can we learn models robust to adversarial inputs?
There is now a sizable body of work proposing various attack and defense mechanisms for the
adversarial setting. Examples include defensive distillation [3, 15, 16], feature squeezing [29, 10], and
several other adversarial example detection approaches [5]. These works constitute important first
steps in exploring the realm of possibilities here. They, however, do not offer a good understanding of
the guarantees they provide. We can never be certain that a given attack finds the “most adversarial”
example in the context, or that a particular defense mechanism prevents the existence of some well-
defined class of adversarial attacks. This makes it difficult to navigate the landscape of adversarial
robustness or to fully evaluate the possible security implications.
In this paper, we study the adversarial robustness of neural networks through the lens of robust
optimization. We use a natural saddle point (min-max) formulation to capture the notion of security
against adversarial attacks in a principled manner. This formulation allows us to be precise about
the type of security guarantee we would like to achieve, i.e., the broad class of attacks we want
to be resistant to (in contrast to defending only against specific known attacks). The formulation
also enables us to cast both attacks and defenses into a common theoretical framework. Most prior
work on adversarial examples naturally fits into this framework. In particular, adversarial training
directly corresponds to optimizing this saddle point problem. Similarly, prior methods for attacking
neural networks correspond to specific algorithms for solving the underlying constrained optimization
problem.
Equipped with this perspective, we make the following contributions.
1. We conduct a careful experimental study of the optimization landscape corresponding to this
saddle point formulation. Despite the non-convexity and non-concavity of its constituent parts,
we find that the underlying optimization problem is tractable after all. In particular, we provide
strong evidence that first-order methods can reliably solve this problem. We supplement these
insights with ideas from real analysis to further motivate projected gradient descent (PGD)
as a universal “first-order adversary”, i.e., the strongest attack utilizing the local first order
information about the network.
2. We explore the impact of network architecture on adversarial robustness and find that model
capacity plays an important role here. To reliably withstand strong adversarial attacks, networks
require a significantly larger capacity than for correctly classifying benign examples only. This
shows that a robust decision boundary of the saddle point problem can be significantly more
complicated than a decision boundary that simply separates the benign data points.
3. Building on the above insights, we train networks on MNIST and CIFAR10 that are robust to
a wide range of adversarial attacks. Our approach is based on optimizing the aforementioned
saddle point formulation and uses our optimal “first-order adversary”. Our best MNIST model
achieves an accuracy of more than 89% against the strongest adversaries in our test suite. In
particular, our MNIST network is even robust against white box attacks of an iterative adversary.
Our CIFAR10 model achieves an accuracy of 46% against the same adversary. Furthermore,
in case of the weaker black box/transfer attacks, our MNIST and CIFAR10 networks achieve
the accuracy of more than 95% and 64%, respectively. (More detailed overview can be found
in Tables 1 and2.) To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to achieve these levels of
robustness on MNIST and CIFAR10 against such a broad set of attacks.
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Overall, these findings suggest that secure neural networks are within reach. In order to further
support this claim, we invite the community to attempt attacks against our MNIST and CIFAR10
networks in the form of a challenge. This will let us evaluate its robustness more accurately,
and potentially lead to novel attack methods in the process. The complete code, along with the
description of the challenge, is available at https://github.com/MadryLab/mnist_challenge and
https://github.com/MadryLab/cifar10_challenge.
2 An Optimization View on Adversarial Robustness
Much of our discussion will revolve around an optimization view of adversarial robustness. This
perspective not only captures the phenomena we want to study in a precise manner, but will
also inform our investigations. To this end, let us consider a standard classification task with an
underlying data distribution D over pairs of examples x ∈ Rd and corresponding labels y ∈ [k]. We
also assume that we are given a suitable loss function L(θ, x, y), for instance the cross-entropy loss
for a neural network. As usual, θ ∈ Rp is the set of model parameters. Our goal then is to find
model parameters θ that minimize the risk E(x,y)∼D[L(x, y, θ)].
Empirical risk minimization (ERM) has been tremendously successful as a recipe for finding
classifiers with small population risk. Unfortunately, ERM often does not yield models that are
robust to adversarially crafted examples [7, 12, 13, 25]. Formally, there are efficient algorithms
(“adversaries”) that take an example x belonging to class c1 as input and find examples xadv such
that xadv is very close to x but the model incorrectly classifies xadv as belonging to class c2 6= c1.
In order to reliably train models that are robust to adversarial attacks, it is necessary to augment
the ERM paradigm appropriately. Instead of resorting to methods that directly focus on improving
the robustness to specific attacks, our approach is to first propose a concrete guarantee that an
adversarially robust model should satisfy. We then adapt our training methods towards achieving
this guarantee.
The first step towards such a guarantee is to specify an attack model, i.e., a precise definition
of the attacks our models should be resistant to. For each data point x, we introduce a set of
allowed perturbations S ⊆ Rd that formalizes the manipulative power of the adversary. In image
classification, we choose S so that it captures perceptual similarity between images. For instance,
the `∞-ball around x has recently been studied as a natural notion for adversarial perturbations [7].
While we focus on robustness against `∞-bounded attacks in this paper, we remark that more
comprehensive notions of perceptual similarity are an important direction for future research.
Next, we modify the definition of population risk ED[L] by incorporating the above adversary.
Instead of feeding samples from the distribution D directly into the loss L, we allow the adversary
to perturb the input first. This gives rise to the following saddle point problem, which is our central
object of study:
min
θ
ρ(θ), where ρ(θ) = E(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ∈S
L(θ, x+ δ, y)
]
. (2.1)
Formulations of this type (and their finite-sample counterparts) have a long history in robust
optimization, going back to Wald [26, 27, 28]. It turns out that this formulation is also particularly
useful in our context.
First, this formulation gives us a unifying perspective that encompasses much prior work on
adversarial robustness. Our perspective stems from viewing the saddle point problem as the
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composition of an inner maximization problem and an outer minimization problem. Both of these
problems have a natural interpretation in our context. The inner maximization problem aims to
find an adversarial version of a given data point x that achieves a high loss. This is precisely the
problem of attacking a given neural network. On the other hand, the goal of the outer minimization
problem is to find model parameters so that the “adversarial loss” given by the inner attack problem
is minimized. This is precisely the problem of training a robust classifier using adversarial training
techniques.
Second, the saddle point problem specifies a clear goal that an ideal robust classifier should
achieve, as well as a quantitative measure of its robustness. In particular, when the parameters θ
yield a (nearly) vanishing risk, the corresponding model is perfectly robust to attacks specified by
our attack model.
Our paper investigates the structure of this saddle point problem in the context of deep neural
networks. These investigations then lead us to training techniques that produce models with high
resistance to a wide range of adversarial attacks. Before turning to our contributions, we briefly
review prior work on adversarial examples and describe in more detail how it fits into the above
formulation.
2.1 A Unified View on Attacks and Defenses
Prior work on adversarial examples has focused on two main questions:
1. How can we produce strong adversarial examples, i.e., adversarial examples that fool a model
with high confidence while requiring only a small perturbation?
2. How can we train a model so that there are no adversarial examples, or at least so that an
adversary cannot find them easily?
Our perspective on the saddle point problem (2.1) gives answers to both these questions. On
the attack side, prior work has proposed methods such as the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
and multiple variations of it [7]. FGSM is an attack for an `∞-bounded adversary and computes an
adversarial example as
x+ ε sgn(∇xL(θ, x, y)).
One can interpret this attack as a simple one-step scheme for maximizing the inner part of the
saddle point formulation. A more powerful adversary is the multi-step variant FGSMk, which is
essentially projected gradient descent (PGD) on the negative loss function [12]:
xt+1 = Πx+S
(
xt + α sgn(∇xL(θ, x, y))
)
.
Other methods like FGSM with random perturbation have also been proposed [24]. Clearly, all
of these approaches can be viewed as specific attempts to solve the inner maximization problem
in (2.1).
On the defense side, the training dataset is often augmented with adversarial examples produced
by FGSM. This approach also directly follows from (2.1) when linearizing the inner maximization
problem. To solve the simplified robust optimization problem, we replace every training example
with its FGSM-perturbed counterpart. More sophisticated defense mechanisms such as training
against multiple adversaries can be seen as better, more exhaustive approximations of the inner
maximization problem.
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3 Towards Universally Robust Networks?
Current work on adversarial examples usually focuses on specific defensive mechanisms, or on attacks
against such defenses. An important feature of formulation (2.1) is that attaining small adversarial
loss gives a guarantee that no allowed attack will fool the network. By definition, no adversarial
perturbations are possible because the loss is small for all perturbations allowed by our attack model.
Hence, we now focus our attention on obtaining a good solution to (2.1).
Unfortunately, while the overall guarantee provided by the saddle point problem is evidently
useful, it is not clear whether we can actually find a good solution in reasonable time. Solving
the saddle point problem (2.1) involves tackling both a non-convex outer minimization problem
and a non-concave inner maximization problem. One of our key contributions is demonstrating
that, in practice, one can solve the saddle point problem after all. In particular, we now discuss
an experimental exploration of the structure given by the non-concave inner problem. We argue
that the loss landscape corresponding to this problem has a surprisingly tractable structure of local
maxima. This structure also points towards projected gradient descent as the “ultimate” first-order
adversary. Sections 4 and 5 then show that the resulting trained networks are indeed robust against
a wide range of attacks, provided the networks are sufficiently large.
3.1 The Landscape of Adversarial Examples
Recall that the inner problem corresponds to finding an adversarial example for a given network
and data point (subject to our attack model). As this problem requires us to maximize a highly
non-concave function, one would expect it to be intractable. Indeed, this is the conclusion reached by
prior work which then resorted to linearizing the inner maximization problem [11, 19]. As pointed out
above, this linearization approach yields well-known methods such as FGSM. While training against
FGSM adversaries has shown some successes, recent work also highlights important shortcomings of
this one-step approach [24].
To understand the inner problem in more detail, we investigate the landscape of local maxima for
multiple models on MNIST and CIFAR10. The main tool in our experiments is projected gradient
descent (PGD), since it is the standard method for large-scale constrained optimization. In order to
explore a large part of the loss landscape, we re-start PGD from many points in the `∞ balls around
data points from the respective evaluation sets.
Surprisingly, our experiments show that the inner problem is tractable after all, at least from the
perspective of first-order methods. While there are many local maxima spread widely apart within
xi + S, they tend to have very well-concentrated loss values. This echoes the folklore belief that
training neural networks is possible because the loss (as a function of model parameters) typically
has many local minima with very similar values.
Specifically, in our experiments we found the following phenomena:
• We observe that the loss achieved by the adversary increases in a fairly consistent way and plateaus
rapidly when performing projected `∞ gradient descent for randomly chosen starting points inside
x+ S (see Figure 1).
• Investigating the concentration of maxima further, we observe that over a large number of random
restarts, the loss of the final iterate follows a well-concentrated distribution without extreme
outliers (see Figure 2; we verified this concentration based on 105 restarts).
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Figure 1: Cross-entropy loss values while creating an adversarial example from the MNIST and
CIFAR10 evaluation datasets. The plots show how the loss evolves during 20 runs of projected
gradient descent (PGD). Each run starts at a uniformly random point in the `∞-ball around the
same natural example (additional plots for different examples appear in Figure 11). The adversarial
loss plateaus after a small number of iterations. The optimization trajectories and final loss values
are also fairly clustered, especially on CIFAR10. Moreover, the final loss values on adversarially
trained networks are significantly smaller than on their naturally trained counterparts.
• To demonstrate that maxima are noticeably distinct, we also measured the `2 distance and angles
between all pairs of them and observed that distances are distributed close to the expected distance
between two random points in the `∞ ball, and angles are close to 90◦. Along the line segment
between local maxima, the loss is convex, attaining its maximum at the endpoints and is reduced
by a constant factor in the middle. Nevertheless, for the entire segment, the loss is considerably
higher than that of a random point.
• Finally, we observe that the distribution of maxima suggests that the recently developed subspace
view of adversarial examples is not fully capturing the richness of attacks [25]. In particular, we
observe adversarial perturbations with negative inner product with the gradient of the example,
and deteriorating overall correlation with the gradient direction as the scale of perturbation
increases.
All of this evidence points towards PGD being a “universal” adversary among first-order ap-
proaches, as we will see next.
3.2 First-Order Adversaries
Our experiments show that the local maxima found by PGD all have similar loss values, both for
normally trained networks and adversarially trained networks. This concentration phenomenon
suggests an intriguing view on the problem in which robustness against the PGD adversary yields
robustness against all first-order adversaries, i.e., attacks that rely only on first-order information. As
long as the adversary only uses gradients of the loss function with respect to the input, we conjecture
that it will not find significantly better local maxima than PGD. We give more experimental evidence
for this hypothesis in Section 5: if we train a network to be robust against PGD adversaries, it
becomes robust against a wide range of other attacks as well.
Of course, our exploration with PGD does not preclude the existence of some isolated maxima
with much larger function value. However, our experiments suggest that such better local maxima
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Figure 2: Values of the local maxima given by the cross-entropy loss for five examples from the
MNIST and CIFAR10 evaluation datasets. For each example, we start projected gradient descent
(PGD) from 105 uniformly random points in the `∞-ball around the example and iterate PGD until
the loss plateaus. The blue histogram corresponds to the loss on a naturally trained network, while
the red histogram corresponds to the adversarially trained counterpart. The loss is significantly
smaller for the adversarially trained networks, and the final loss values are very concentrated without
any outliers.
are hard to find with first order methods: even a large number of random restarts did not find
function values with significantly different loss values. Incorporating the computational power of
the adversary into the attack model should be reminiscent of the notion of polynomially bounded
adversary that is a cornerstone of modern cryptography. There, this classic attack model allows
the adversary to only solve problems that require at most polynomial computation time. Here,
we employ an optimization-based view on the power of the adversary as it is more suitable in the
context of machine learning. After all, we have not yet developed a thorough understanding of the
computational complexity of many recent machine learning problems. However, the vast majority
of optimization problems in ML is solved with first-order methods, and variants of SGD are the
most effective way of training deep learning models in particular. Hence we believe that the class of
attacks relying on first-order information is, in some sense, universal for the current practice of deep
learning.
Put together, these two ideas chart the way towards machine learning models with guaranteed
robustness. If we train the network to be robust against PGD adversaries, it will be robust against a
wide range of attacks that encompasses all current approaches.
In fact, this robustness guarantee would become even stronger in the context of transfer attacks,
i.e., attacks in which the adversary does not have a direct access to the target network. Instead, the
adversary only has less specific information such as the (rough) model architecture and the training
data set. One can view this attack model as an example of “zero order” attacks, i.e., attacks in which
the adversary has no direct access to the classifier and is only able to evaluate it on chosen examples
without gradient feedback.
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We discuss transferability in Section B of the appendix. We observe that increasing network
capacity and strengthening the adversary we train against (FGSM or PGD training, rather than
natural training) improves resistance against transfer attacks. Also, as expected, the resistance of
our best models to such attacks tends to be significantly larger than to the (strongest) first order
attacks.
3.3 Descent Directions for Adversarial Training
The preceding discussion suggests that the inner optimization problem can be successfully solved
by applying PGD. In order to train adversarially robust networks, we also need to solve the outer
optimization problem of the saddle point formulation (2.1), that is find model parameters that
minimize the “adversarial loss”, the value of the inner maximization problem.
In the context of training neural networks, the main method for minimizing the loss function is
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD). A natural way of computing the gradient of the outer problem,
∇θρ(θ), is computing the gradient of the loss function at a maximizer of the inner problem. This
corresponds to replacing the input points by their corresponding adversarial perturbations and
normally training the network on the perturbed input. A priori, it is not clear that this is a valid
descent direction for the saddle point problem. However, for the case of continuously differentiable
functions, Danskin’s theorem –a classic theorem in optimization– states this is indeed true and
gradients at inner maximizers corresponds to descent directions for the saddle point problem.
Despite the fact that the exact assumptions of Danskin’s theorem do not hold for our problem
(the function is not continuously differentiable due to ReLU and max-pooling units, and we are
only computing approximate maximizers of the inner problem), our experiments suggest that we
can still use these gradients to optimize our problem. By applying SGD using the gradient of the
loss at adversarial examples we can consistently reduce the loss of the saddle point problem during
training, as can be seen in Figure 5. These observations suggest that we reliably optimize the saddle
point formulation (2.1) and thus train robust classifiers. We formally state Danskin’s theorem and
describe how it applies to our problem in Section A of the Appendix.
4 Network Capacity and Adversarial Robustness
Solving the problem from Equation (2.1) successfully is not sufficient to guarantee robust and
accurate classification. We need to also argue that the value of the problem (i.e. the final loss we
achieve against adversarial examples) is small, thus providing guarantees for the performance of our
classifier. In particular, achieving a very small value corresponds to a perfect classifier, which is
robust to adversarial inputs.
For a fixed set S of possible perturbations, the value of the problem is entirely dependent on the
architecture of the classifier we are learning. Consequently, the architectural capacity of the model
becomes a major factor affecting its overall performance. At a high level, classifying examples in
a robust way requires a stronger classifier, since the presence of adversarial examples changes the
decision boundary of the problem to a more complicated one (see Figure 3 for an illustration).
Our experiments verify that capacity is crucial for robustness, as well as for the ability to success-
fully train against strong adversaries. For the MNIST dataset, we consider a simple convolutional
network and study how its behavior changes against different adversaries as we keep doubling the size
of network (i.e. double the number of convolutional filters and the size of the fully connected layer).
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Figure 3: A conceptual illustration of “natural” vs. “adversarial” decision boundaries. Left: A set of
points that can be easily separated with a simple (in this case, linear) decision boundary. Middle:
The simple decision boundary does not separate the `∞-balls (here, squares) around the data points.
Hence there are adversarial examples (the red stars) that will be misclassified. Right: Separating
the `∞-balls requires a significantly more complicated decision boundary. The resulting classifier is
robust to adversarial examples with bounded `∞-norm perturbations.
The initial network has a convolutional layer with 2 filters, followed by another convolutional layer
with 4 filters, and a fully connected hidden layer with 64 units. Convolutional layers are followed by
2× 2 max-pooling layers and adversarial examples are constructed with ε = 0.3. The results are in
Figure 4.
For the CIFAR10 dataset, we used the Resnet model [9, 1]. We performed data augmentation
using random crops and flips, as well as per image standarization. To increase the capacity, we
modified the network incorporating wider layers by a factor of 10. This results in a network with 5
residual units with (16, 160, 320, 640) filters each. This network can achieve an accuracy of 95.2%
when trained with natural examples. Adversarial examples were constructed with ε = 8. Results on
capacity experiments appear in Figure 4.
We observe the following phenomena:
Capacity alone helps. We observe that increasing the capacity of the network when training using
only natural examples (apart from increasing accuracy on these examples) increases the robustness
against one-step perturbations. This effect is greater when considering adversarial examples with
smaller ε.
FGSM adversaries don’t increase robustness (for large ε). When training the network
using adversarial examples generated with the FGSM, we observe that the network overfits to these
adversarial examples. This behavior is known as label leaking [12] and stems from the fact that the
adversary produces a very restricted set of adversarial examples that the network can overfit to.
These networks have poor performance on natural examples and don’t exhibit any kind of robustness
against PGD adversaries. For the case of smaller ε the loss is ofter linear enough in the `∞ ball
around natural examples, that FGSM finds adversarial examples close to those found by PGD thus
being a reasonable adversary to train against.
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Weak models may fail to learn non-trivial classifiers. In the case of small capacity networks,
attempting to train against a strong adversary (PGD) prevents the network from learning anything
meaningful. The network converges to always predicting a fixed class, even though it could converge
to an accurate classifier through natural training. The small capacity of the network forces the
training procedure to sacrifice performance on natural examples in order to provide any kind of
robustness against adversarial inputs.
The value of the saddle point problem decreases as we increase the capacity. Fixing an
adversary model, and training against it, the value of (2.1) drops as capacity increases, indicating
the the model can fit the adversarial examples increasingly well.
More capacity and stronger adversaries decrease transferability. Either increasing the
capacity of the network, or using a stronger method for the inner optimization problem reduces the
effectiveness of transferred adversarial inputs. We validate this experimentally by observing that the
correlation between gradients from the source and the transfer network, becomes less significant as
capacity increases. We describe our experiments in Section B of the appendix.
MNIST
1 2 4 8 16
0
20
40
60
80
100
Capacity scale
A
cc
ur
ac
y
1 2 4 8 16
0
20
40
60
80
100
Capacity scale
1 2 4 8 16
0
20
40
60
80
100
Capacity scale
1 2 4 8 16
0.01
0.1
1
Capacity scale
Av
er
ag
e
lo
ss
Natural
FGSM
PGD
CIFAR10
Simple Wide
Natural 92.7% 95.2%
FGSM 27.5% 32.7%
PGD 0.8% 3.5%
Simple Wide
87.4% 90.3%
90.9% 95.1%
0.0% 0.0%
Simple Wide
79.4% 87.3%
51.7% 56.1%
43.7% 45.8%
Simple Wide
0.00357 0.00371
0.0115 0.00557
1.11 0.0218
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Figure 4: The effect of network capacity on the performance of the network. We trained MNIST and
CIFAR10 networks of varying capacity on: (a) natural examples, (b) with FGSM-made adversarial
examples, (c) with PGD-made adversarial examples. In the first three plots/tables of each dataset,
we show how the natural and adversarial accuracy changes with respect to capacity for each training
regime. In the final plot/table, we show the value of the cross-entropy loss on the adversarial
examples the networks were trained on. This corresponds to the value of our saddle point formulation
(2.1) for different sets of allowed perturbations.
5 Experiments: Adversarially Robust Deep Learning Models?
Following the understanding of the problem we developed in previous sections, we can now apply
our proposed approach to train robust classifiers. As our experiments so far demonstrated, we need
10
to focus on two key elements: a) train a sufficiently high capacity network, b) use the strongest
possible adversary.
For both MNIST and CIFAR10, the adversary of choice will be projected gradient descent
starting from a random perturbation around the natural example. This corresponds to our notion of
a "complete" first-order adversary, an algorithm that can efficiently maximize the loss of an example
using only first order information. Since we are training the model for multiple epochs, there is no
benefit from restarting PGD multiple times per batch – a new start will be chosen the next time
each example is encountered.
When training against the adversary, we observe a steady decrease in the training loss of
adversarial examples, illustrated in Figure 5. This behavior indicates that we are indeed successfully
solving our original optimization problem during training.
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Figure 5: Cross-entropy loss on adversarial examples during training. The plots show how the
adversarial loss on training examples evolves during training the MNIST and CIFAR10 networks
against a PGD adversary. The sharp drops in the CIFAR10 plot correspond to decreases in training
step size. These plots illustrate that we can consistently reduce the value of the inner problem of the
saddle point formulation (2.1), thus producing an increasingly robust classifier.
We evaluate the trained models against a range of adversaries. We illustrate our results in Table 1
for MNIST and Table 2 for CIFAR10. The adversaries we consider are:
• White-box attacks with PGD for a different number of of iterations and restarts, denoted by
source A.
• White-box attacks from [4]. We use their suggested loss function and minimize it using PGD.
This is denoted as CW, where the corresponding attack with a high confidence parameter
(κ = 50) is denoted as CW+.
• Black-box attacks from an independently trained copy of the network, denoted A’.
• Black-box attacks from a version of the same network trained only on natural examples,
denoted Anat.
• Black-box attacks from a different convolution architecture, denoted B, described in [24].
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MNIST. We run 40 iterations of projected gradient descent as our adversary, with a step size of
0.01 (we choose to take gradient steps in the `∞ norm, i.e. adding the sign of the gradient, since this
makes the choice of the step size simpler). We train and evaluate against perturbations of size ε = 0.3.
We use a network consisting of two convolutional layers with 32 and 64 filters respectively, each
followed by 2× 2 max-pooling, and a fully connected layer of size 1024. When trained with natural
examples, this network reaches 99.2% accuracy on the evaluation set. However, when evaluating
on examples perturbed with FGSM the accuracy drops to 6.4%. Given that the resulting MNIST
model is very robust, we investigated the learned parameters in order to understand how they affect
adversarial robustness. The results of the investigation are presented in Appendix C.
Method Steps Restarts Source Accuracy
Natural - - - 98.8%
FGSM - - A 95.6%
PGD 40 1 A 93.2%
PGD 100 1 A 91.8%
PGD 40 20 A 90.4%
PGD 100 20 A 89.3%
Targeted 40 1 A 92.7%
CW 40 1 A 94.0%
CW+ 40 1 A 93.9%
FGSM - - A’ 96.8%
PGD 40 1 A’ 96.0%
PGD 100 20 A’ 95.7%
CW 40 1 A’ 97.0%
CW+ 40 1 A’ 96.4%
FGSM - - B 95.4%
PGD 40 1 B 96.4%
CW+ - - B 95.7%
Table 1: MNIST: Performance of the adversarially trained network against different adversaries for
ε = 0.3. For each model of attack we show the most successful attack with bold. The source networks
used for the attack are: the network itself (A) (white-box attack), an indepentenly initialized and
trained copy of the network (A’), architecture B from [24] (B).
CIFAR10. For the CIFAR10 dataset, we use the two architectures described in 4 (the original
Resnet and its 10× wider variant). We trained the network against a PGD adversary with `∞
projected gradient descent again, this time using 7 steps of size 2, and a total ε = 8. For our hardest
adversary we chose 20 steps with the same settings, since other hyperparameter choices didn’t offer
a significant decrease in accuracy. The results of our experiments appear in Table 2.
The adversarial robustness of our network is significant, given the power of iterative adversaries,
but still far from satisfactory. We believe that these results can be improved by further pushing
along these directions, and training networks of larger capacity.
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Method Steps Source Accuracy
Natural - - 87.3%
FGSM - A 56.1%
PGD 7 A 50.0%
PGD 20 A 45.8%
CW 30 A 46.8%
FGSM - A’ 67.0%
PGD 7 A’ 64.2%
CW 30 A’ 78.7%
FGSM - Anat 85.6%
PGD 7 Anat 86.0%
Table 2: CIFAR10: Performance of the adversarially trained network against different adversaries
for ε = 8. For each model of attack we show the most effective attack in bold. The source networks
considered for the attack are: the network itself (A) (white-box attack), an independtly initialized
and trained copy of the network (A’), a copy of the network trained on natural examples (Anat).
Resistance for different values of ε and `2-bounded attacks. In order to perform a broader
evaluation of the adversarial robustness of our models, we run two kinds of additional experiments.
On one hand, we investigate the resistance to `∞-bounded attacks for different values of ε. On the
other hand, we examine the resistance of our model to attacks that are bounded in `2 as opposed
to `∞ norm. The results appear in Figure 6. We emphasize that the models we are examining
here correspond to training against `∞-bounded attacks with the original value of ε = 0.3, for
MNIST, and ε = 8 for CIFAR10. In particular, our MNIST model retains significant resistance to
`2-norm-bounded perturbations too – it has quite good accuracy in this regime even for ε = 4.5. To
put this value of ε into perspective, we provide a sample of corresponding adversarial examples in
Figure 12 of Appendix D. One can observe that the underlying perturbations are large enough that
even human could be confused.
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Figure 6: Performance of our adversarially trained networks against PGD adversaries of different
strength. The MNIST and CIFAR10 networks were trained against ε = 0.3 and ε = 8 PGD `∞
adversaries respectively (the training ε is denoted with a red dashed lines in the `∞ plots). We
notice that for ε less or equal to the value used during training, the performance is equal or better.
For MNIST there is a sharp drop shortly after.
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6 Related Work
Due to the growing body of work on adversarial examples [8, 6, 23, 17, 3, 25, 7, 12], we focus only
on the most related papers here. Before we compare our contributions, we remark that robust
optimization has been studied outside deep learning for multiple decades. We refer the reader to [2]
for an overview of this field.
Recent work on adversarial training on ImageNet also observed that the model capacity is
important for adversarial training [12]. In contrast to this paper, we find that training against
multi-step methods (PGD) does lead to resistance against such adversaries. Moreover, we study the
loss landscape of the saddle point problem in more detail.
In [11] and [19] a version of the min-max optimization problem is also considered for adversarial
training. There are, however, three important differences between the formerly mentioned result
and the present paper. Firstly, the authors claim that the inner maximization problem can be
difficult to solve, whereas we explore the loss surface in more detail and find that randomly re-started
projected gradient descent often converges to solutions with comparable quality. This shows that
it is possible to obtain sufficiently good solutions to the inner maximization problem, which offers
good evidence that deep neural network can be immunized against adversarial examples. Secondly,
they consider only one-step adversaries, while we work with multi-step methods. Additionally, while
the experiments in [19] produce promising results, they are only evaluated against FGSM. However,
FGSM-only evaluations are not fully reliable. One evidence for that is that [19] reports 70% accuracy
for ε = 0.7, but any adversary that is allowed to perturb each pixel by more than 0.5 can construct
a uniformly gray image, thus fooling any classifier.
A more recent paper [25] also explores the transferability phenomenon. This exploration focuses
mostly on the region around natural examples where the loss is (close to) linear. When large
perturbations are allowed, this region does not give a complete picture of the adversarial landscape.
This is confirmed by our experiments, as well as pointed out by [24].
Another recent paper [24], considers adversarial training using black-box attacks from similar
networks in order to increase the robustness of the network against such adversaries. However, this
is not an effective defense against the white-box setting we consider, since a PGD adversary can
reliably produce adversarial examples for such networks.
7 Conclusion
Our findings provide evidence that deep neural networks can be made resistant to adversarial attacks.
As our theory and experiments indicate, we can design reliable adversarial training methods. One of
the key insights behind this is the unexpectedly regular structure of the underlying optimization
task: even though the relevant problem corresponds to the maximization of a highly non-concave
function with many distinct local maxima, their values are highly concentrated. Overall, our findings
give us hope that adversarially robust deep learning models may be within current reach.
For the MNIST dataset, our networks are very robust, achieving high accuracy for a wide range
of powerful adversaries and large perturbations. Our experiments on CIFAR10 have not reached
the same level of performance yet. However, our results already show that our techniques lead to
significant increase in the robustness of the network. We believe that further exploring this direction
will lead to adversarially robust networks for this dataset.
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A Statement and Application of Danskin’s Theorem
Recall that our goal is to minimize the value of the saddle point problem
min
θ
ρ(θ), where ρ(θ) = E(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ∈S
L(θ, x+ δ, y)
]
.
In practice, we don’t have access to the distribution D so both the gradients and the value of ρ(θ)
will be computed using sampled input points. Therefore we can consider –without loss of generality–
the case of a single random example x with label y, in which case the problem becomes
min
θ
max
δ∈S
g(θ, δ), where g(θ, δ) = L(θ, x+ δ, y) .
If we assume that the loss L is continuously differentiable in θ, we can compute a descent direction
for θ by utilizing the classical theorem of Danskin.
Theorem A.1 (Danskin). Let S be nonempty compact topological space and g : Rn × S → R be
such that g(·, δ) is differentiable for every δ ∈ S and ∇θg(θ, δ) is continuous on Rn × S. Also, let
δ∗(θ) = {δ ∈ arg maxδ∈S g(θ, δ)}.
Then the corresponding max-function
φ(θ) = max
δ∈S
g(θ, δ)
is locally Lipschitz continuous, directionally differentiable, and its directional derivatives satisfy
φ′(θ, h) = sup
δ∈δ∗(θ)
h>∇θg(θ, δ) .
In particular, if for some θ ∈ Rn the set δ∗(θ) = {δ∗θ} is a singleton, the the max-function is
differentiable at θ and
∇φ(θ) = ∇θg(θ, δ∗θ)
The intution behind the theorem is that since gradients are local objects, and the function φ(θ)
is locally the same as g(θ, δ∗θ) their gradients will be the same. The theorem immediately gives us the
following corollary, stating the we can indeed compute gradients for the saddle point by computing
gradients at the inner optimizers.
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Corollary A.2. Let δ be such that δ ∈ S and is a maximizer for maxδ L(θ, x+ δ, y). Then, as long
as it is nonzero, −∇θL(θ, x+ δ, y) is a descent direction for φ(θ) = maxδ∈S L(θ, x+ δ, y).
Proof of Corollary A.2. We apply Theorem A.1 to g(θ, δ) := L(θ, x+ δ, y) and S = B‖·‖(ε). We see
that the directional derivative in the direction of h = ∇θL(θ, x+ δ, y) satisfies
φ′(θ, h) = sup
δ∈δ∗(θ)
h>∇θL(θ, x+ δ, y) ≥ h>h = ‖∇θL(θ, x+ δ, y)‖22 ≥ 0 .
If this gradient is nonzero, then the inequality above is strict. Therefore it gives a descent direction.
A technical issue is that, since we use ReLU and max-pooling units in our neural network
architecture, the loss function is not continuously differentiable. Nevertheless, since the set of
discontinuities has measure zero, we can assume that this will not be an issue in practice, as we will
never encounter the problematic points.
Another technical issue is that, due to the not concavity of the inner problem, we are not able to
compute global maximizers, since PGD will converge to local maxima. In such cases, we can consider
a subset S ′ of S such that the local maximum is a global maximum in the region S ′. Applying
the theorem for S ′ gives us that the gradient corresponds to a descent direction for the saddle
point problem when the adversary is constrained in S ′. Therefore if the inner maximum is a true
adversarial example for the network, then SGD using the gradient at that point will decrease the
loss value at this particular adversarial examples, thus making progress towards a robust model.
These arguments suggest that the conclusions of the theorem are still valid in our saddle point
problem, and –as our experiments confirm– we can solve it reliably.
B Transferability
A lot of recent literature on adversarial training discusses the phenomenon of transferability [7, 12, 25],
i.e. adversarial examples transfer between differently trained networks. This raises concerns for
practical applications, since it suggests that deep networks are extremely vulnerable to attacks, even
when there is no direct access to the target network.
This phenomenon is further confirmed by our current experiments. 1 Moreover, we notice that
the extent to which adversarial examples transfer decreases as we increase either network capacity
or the power of the adversary used for training the network. This serves as evidence for the fact that
the transferability phenomenon can be alleviated by using high capacity networks in conjunction
with strong oracles for the inner optimization problem.
MNIST. In an attempt to understand these phenomena we inspect the loss functions corresponding
to the trained models we used for testing transferability. More precisely, we compute angles between
gradients of the loss functions evaluated over a large set of input examples, and plot their distribution.
Similarly, we plot the value of the loss functions between clean and perturbed examples for both
the source and transfer networks. In Figure 8 we plot our experimental findings on the MNIST
1Our experiments involve transferability between networks with the same architecture (potentially with layers of
varying sizes), trained with the same method, but with different random initializations. The reason we consider these
models rather than highly different architectures is that they are likely the worst case instances for transferability.
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dataset for ε = 0.3. We consider a naturally trained large network (two convolutional layers of sizes
32 and 64, and a fully connected layer of size 1024), which we train twice starting with different
initializations. We plot the distribution of angles between gradients for the same test image in
the two resulting networks (orange histograms), noting that they are somewhat correlated. As
opposed to this, we see that pairs of gradients for random pairs of inputs for one architecture are as
uncorrelated as they can be (blue histograms), since the distribution of their angles looks Gaussian.
Next, we run the same experiment on a naturally trained very large network (two convolutional
layers of sizes 64 and 128, and a fully connected layer of size 1024). We notice a mild increase in
classification accuracy for transferred examples.
Finally, we repeat the same set of experiments, after training the large and very large networks
against the FGSM adversary. We notice that gradients between the two architectures become
significantly less correlated. Also, the classification accuracy for transferred examples increases
significantly compared to the naturally trained networks.
We further plot how the value of the loss function changes when moving from the natural input
towards the adversarially perturbed input (in Figure 8 we show these plots for four images in the
MNIST test dataset), for each pair of networks we considered. We observe that, while for the
naturally trained networks, when moving towards the perturbed point, the value of the loss function
on the transfer architecture tends to start increasing soon after it starts increasing on the source
architecture. In contrast, for the stronger models, the loss function on the transfer network tends to
start increasing later, and less aggressively.
CIFAR10. For the CIFAR10 dataset, we investigate the transferability of the FGSM and PGD
adversaries between our simple and wide architectures, each trained on natural, FGSM and PGD
examples. Transfer accuracies for the FGSM adversary and PGD adversary between all pairs of such
configurations (model + training method) with independently random weight initialization are given
in tables 3 and 4 respectively. The results exhibit the following trends:
• Stronger adversaries decrease transferability: In particular, transfer attacks between
two PGD-trained models are less successful than transfer attacks between their naturally-
trained counterparts. Moreover, adding PGD training helps with transferability from all
adversarial datasets, except for those with source a PGD-trained model themselves. This
applies to both FGSM attacks and PGD attacks.
• Capacity decreases transferability: In particular, transfer attacks between two PGD-
trained wide networks are less successful than transfer attacks between their simple PGD-
trained counterparts. Moreover, with few close exceptions, changing the architecture from
simple to wide (and keeping the training method the same) helps with transferability from all
adversarial datasets.
We additionally plotted how the loss of a network behaves in the direction of FGSM and PGD
examples obtained from itself and an independently trained copy; results for the simple naturally
trained network and the wide PGD trained network are given in Table 7. As expected, we observe
the following phenomena:
• sometimes, the FGSM adversary manages to increase loss faster near the natural example, but
as we move towards the boundary of the `∞ box of radius ε, the PGD attack always achieves
higher loss.
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• the transferred attacks do worse than their white-box counterparts in terms of increasing the
loss;
• and yet, the transferred PGD attacks dominate the white-box FGSM attacks for the naturally
trained network (and sometimes for the PGD-trained one too).
Target
Source Simple(natural
training)
Simple
(FGSM
training)
Simple
(PGD
training)
Wide
(natural
training)
Wide
(FGSM
training)
Wide
(PGD
training)
Simple
(natural training) 32.9% 74.0% 73.7% 27.6% 71.8% 76.6%
Simple
(FGSM training) 64.2% 90.7% 60.9% 61.5% 90.2% 67.3%
Simple
(PGD training) 77.1% 78.1% 60.2% 77.0% 77.9% 66.3%
Wide
(natural training) 34.9% 78.7% 80.2% 21.3% 75.8% 80.6%
Wide
(FGSM training) 64.5% 93.6% 69.1% 53.7% 92.2% 72.8%
Wide
(PGD training) 85.8% 86.6% 73.3% 85.6% 86.2% 67.0%
Table 3: CIFAR10: black-box FGSM attacks. We create FGSM adversarial examples with ε = 8 from
the evaluation set on the source network, and then evaluate them on an independently initialized
target network.
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Target
Source Simple(natural
training)
Simple
(FGSM
training)
Simple
(PGD
training)
Wide
(natural
training)
Wide
(FGSM
training)
Wide
(PGD
training)
Simple
(natural training) 6.6% 71.6% 71.8% 1.4% 51.4% 75.6%
Simple
(FGSM training) 66.3% 40.3% 58.4% 65.4% 26.8% 66.2%
Simple
(PGD training) 78.1% 78.2% 57.7% 77.9% 78.1% 65.2%
Wide
(natural training) 10.9% 79.6% 79.1% 0.0% 51.3% 79.7%
Wide
(FGSM training) 67.6% 51.7% 67.4% 56.5% 0.0% 71.6%
Wide
(PGD training) 86.4% 86.8% 72.1% 86.0% 86.3% 64.2%
Table 4: CIFAR10: black-box PGD attacks. We create PGD adversarial examples with ε = 8 for 7
iterations from the evaluation set on the source network, and then evaluate them on an independently
initialized target network.
Model
Adversary Natural FGSM FGSM random PGD (7 steps) PGD (20 steps)
Simple
(natural training) 92.7% 27.5% 19.6% 1.2% 0.8%
Simple
(FGSM training) 87.4% 90.9% 90.4% 0.0% 0.0%
Simple
(PGD training) 79.4% 51.7% 55.9% 47.1% 43.7%
Wide
(natural training) 95.2% 32.7% 25.1% 4.1% 3.5%
Wide
(FGSM training) 90.3% 95.1% 95.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Wide
(PGD training) 87.3% 56.1% 60.3% 50.0% 45.8%
Table 5: CIFAR10: white-box attacks for ε = 8. For each architecture and training method, we list
the accuracy of the resulting network on the full CIFAR10 evaluation set of 10,000 examples. The
FGSM random method is the one suggested by [24], whereby we first do a small random perturbation
of the natural example, and the apply FGSM to that.
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Figure 7: CIFAR10: change of loss function in the direction of white-box and black-box FGSM
and PGD examples with ε = 8 for the same five natural examples. Each line shows how the loss
changes as we move from the natural example to the corresponding adversarial example. Top: simple
naturally trained model. Bottom: wide PGD trained model. We plot the loss of the original network
in the direction of the FGSM example for the original network (red lines), 5 PGD examples for
the original network obtained from 5 random starting points (blue lines), the FGSM example for
an independently trained copy network (green lines) and 5 PGD examples for the copy network
obtained from 5 random starting points (black lines). All PGD attacks use 100 steps with step size
0.3.
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Source Transfer
Clean 99.2% 99.2%
FGSM 3.9% 41.9%
PGD 0.0% 26.0%
Large network, natural
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Source Transfer
Clean 99.2% 99.3%
FGSM 7.2% 44.6%
PGD 0.0% 35.0%
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Source Transfer
Clean 92.9% 96.1%
FGSM 99.9% 62.0%
PGD 0.0% 54.1%
Large network, FGSM
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Source Transfer
Clean 96.4% 97.8%
FGSM 99.4% 71.6%
PGD 0.0% 60.6%
Very large network, FGSM
training  40     50     60     70    80     90   100   110
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Figure 8: Transferability experiments for four different instances (naturally trained large and very
large networks, and FGSM-trained large and very large networks, respectively). For each instance
we ran the same training algorithm twice, starting from different initializations. Tables on the
left show the accuracy of the networks against three types of input (clean, perturbed with FGSM,
perturbed with PGD ran for 40 steps); the first column shows the resilience of the first network
against examples produced using its own gradients, the second column shows resilience of the second
network against examples transferred from the former network. The histograms reflect angles between
pairs of gradients corresponding to the same inputs versus the baseline consisting of angles between
gradients from random pairs of points. Images on the right hand side reflect how the loss functions
of the native and the transfer network change when moving in the direction of the perturbation; the
perturbation is at 1 on the horizontal axis. Plots in the top row are for FGSM perturbations, plots
in the bottom row are for PGD perturbations produced over 40 iterations.
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C MNIST Inspection
The robust MNIST model described so far is small enough that we can visually inspect most of its
parameters. Doing so will allow us to understand how it is different from a naturally trained variant
and what are the general characteristics of a network that is robust against `∞ adversaries. We will
compare three different networks: a naturally trained model, and two adversarially trained ones.
The latter two models are identical, modulo the random weight initialization, and were used as the
public and secret models used for our robustness challenge.
Initially, we examine the first convolutional layer of each network. We observe that the robust
models only utilize 3 out of the total 32 filters, and for each of these filters only one weight is
non-zero. By doing so, the convolution degrades into a scaling of the original image. Combined with
the bias and the ReLU that follows, this results in a thresholding filter, or equivalently ReLU(αx−β)
for some constants α, β. From the perspective of adversarial robustness, thresholding filters are
immune to any perturbations on pixels with value less than β − ε. We visualize a sample of the
filters in Figure 9 (plots a, c, and e).
Having observed that the first layer of the network essentially maps the original image to three
copies thresholded at different values, we examine the second convolutional layer of the classifier.
Again, the filter weights are relatively sparse and have a significantly wider value range than the
naturally trained version. Since only three channels coming out of the first layer matter, is follows
(and is verified) that the only relevant convolutional filters are those that interact with these three
channels. We visualize a sample of the filters in Figure 9 (plots b, d, and f).
Finally, we examine the softmax/output layer of the network. While the weights seem to be
roughly similar between all three version of the network, we notice a significant difference in the
class biases. The adversarially trained networks heavily utilize class biases (far from uniform), and
do so in a way very similar to each other. A plausible explanation is that certain classes tend to
be very vulnerable to adversarial perturbations, and the network learns to be more conservative in
predicting them. The plots can be found in Figure 10.
All of the “tricks” described so far seem intuitive to a human and would seem reasonable directions
when trying to increase the adversarial robustness of a classifier. We emphasize the none of these
modifications were hard-coded in any way and they were all learned solely through adversarial
training. We attempted to manually introduce these modifications ourselves, aiming to achieve
adversarial robustness without adversarial training, but with no success. A simple PGD adversary
could fool the resulting models on all the test set examples.
D Supplementary Figures
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(a) Natural Model First Conv. Layers (b) Natural Model Second Conv. Layer
(c) Public Model First Conv. Layers (d) Public Model Second Conv. Layer
(e) Secret Model First Conv. Layers (f) Secret Model Second Conv. Layer
0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 3 2 1 0 1
Figure 9: Visualizing a sample of the convolutional filters. For the natural model (a,b) we visualize
random filters, since there is no observable difference in any of them. For the first layer of robust
networks we make sure to include the 3 non-zero filters. For the second layer, the first three columns
represent convolutional filters that utilize the 3 non-zero channels, and we choose the most interesting
ones (larger range of values). We observe that adversarially trained networks have significantly more
concentrated weights. Moreover, the first convolutional layer degrades into a few thresholding filters.
25
0 2 4 6 8
Class
0.050
0.075
0.100
0.125
0.150
0.175
So
ftm
ax
 b
ia
s
natural
public
secret
0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
Softmax weight
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
natural
public
secret
(a) Softmax biases for each class (b) Distribution of softmax weights
Figure 10: Softmax layer examination. For each network we create a histogram of the layer’s weights
and plot the per-class bias. We observe that while weights are similar (slightly more concentrated for
the natural one) the biases are far from uniform and with a similar pattern for the two adversarially
trained networks.
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Figure 11: Loss function value over PGD iterations for 20 random restarts on random examples. The
1st and 3rd rows correspond to naturally trained networks, while the 2nd and 4th to adversarially
trained ones.
Natural: 9 Natural: 9 Natural: 8 Natural: 8 Natural: 2
Adversarial: 7 Adversarial: 4 Adversarial: 5 Adversarial: 3 Adversarial: 3
Figure 12: Sample adversarial examples with `2 norm bounded by 4. The perturbations are significant
enough to cause misclassification by humans too.
27
